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ABSTRACT

On October 1st, 1946, the Nuremberg high command trails ended. The executions and
life sentences of representatives of the German military and political elite were carried
out by the Allied powers. At the time, the Soviet Union posed a greater threat than the
Germans tried at Nuremberg. Years later, on October 9th, 1950, former officers of the
German military gathered in Himmerod Abbey. Together they wrote the Himmerod
Memorandum, which laid the foundation of the German rearmament and called for the
release of German soldiers (Wehrmacht) and Schutzstaffel (SS) members convicted of
war crimes. The Allies, desperate for another line of defense in Europe, agreed to release
Wehrmacht war criminals and portray them as members of a “Clean” Wehrmacht in the
hopes of building an experienced, legitimate army that could stand against potential
Soviet invasion.
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The “Clean Wehrmacht”:
Myths about German War Crimes Then and Now
On November 20th, 1945, the Nuremberg Trails began in occupied Germany. For
nearly a year, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) chronicled the crimes of the Nazi
Party and their top collaborators. Over the course of the trials, German commanders and
the general staff of the German Army, the Wehrmacht, routinely refused to acknowledge
any wrong doings that occurred under their command. To admit to the crimes committed
during the Second World War was an admission of guilt that would lead to execution.
When evidence of illegal orders was presented by the international prosecution to the
court, many Germans simply denied giving the order at all. One such example was the
interview of General Heinz Guderian, in which he stated that he had received from
Oberkommando Wehrmacht (OKW), otherwise known as army high command, the
orders to carry out the elimination of resistance and prisoners of war captured on the
Eastern Front. When pressed on what he did with these orders, Guderian responded that,
“…I know the order never reached my troops.”1 With this statement, he suggests that
upon receiving the orders he did not “pass on this order to [his] subordinates,” because of
its criminal nature.2 Until their dying breath (1939-1995), most of the Nazi elite refused
to acknowledge their part in the atrocities that occurred. In 1961, captured Nazi Adolf
Eichmann summed up the mood of the German defense at Nuremberg during his own
trial in Israel “…I would stress that I am guilty of having been obedient…”3 The
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testimonies of these men would later create one of the most pervasive myths to have
surfaced since the war. The so-called “Clean” Wehrmacht Myth would plague German
society for decades to come, feeding into the foundations of other myths, including
Holocaust denial.
This thesis examine the ramifications of the Nuremberg Tribunal with the later
creation of the myth of the “Clean” Wehrmacht by both post-war Germany and the newly
hegemonic United States. Perpetuated after the Second World War ended, the “Clean”
Wehrmacht Myth incorrectly inferred that the Wehrmacht had little to no part in the
atrocities committed by the Nazi regime. The discussion on how to present the history of
the German atrocities has spawned a long and contentious debate. Some have chosen to
become deniers of German crimes, like French politician Paul Rassinier, whose work
inspired decades of Holocaust denial.4 Another example is the German film industry,
which produced pro-Wehrmacht films in the 1950s and early 1960s, blurring the memory
of the common German.5 Events such as the Cold War also shaped the growth of the
myth, allowing German commanders who had escaped imprisonment to release those
already in prison for renewed service in in the new German army, the Bundeswehr, for
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Western Germany. The failure of
the American Denazification program in West Germany left the new nation riddled with
former Nazis and sympathizers who were never dealt with. The “Clean” Wehrmacht:
Myths about German War Crimes Then and Now” attempts to examine the origins of the
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myth and how it changed over time among the NATO powers. By doing so, this project
intends to illustrate how the narrative of Nazi military atrocities in German history have
altered since the Second World War’s end.
Primarily, this thesis will attempt to answer the following questions: How did the
testimonies of German generals at Nuremberg and subsequent war trials help create the
“Clean” Wehrmacht myth? What part did the memoirs of Germans play in creating the
myth? By answering these questions, this project will provide a more concise history of
post-war German society through a historiographical lens. Examining the foundations
and results of the “Clean” Wehrmacht Myth sheds light on the less frequently discussed
German cultural recovery during the Cold War and into the 21st century. This project
offers a unique interpretation of the Nuremberg testimonies and how they shaped the
reconstruction of West Germany including the creation of its own federal army. This
project will answer these inquiries by utilizing published books, court transcripts and
scholarly articles.

Literature Review & Historical Context
Since the Second World War’s end, examinations of the war crimes of the
German Army, known as the Wehrmacht, have been carefully scrutinized. During the
1945-1946 Nuremberg Trails, the German military and political structure were held
accountable for their crimes before the International Military Tribunal (IMT). At the end
of the trails, two of the German high command, Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl, were
executed by hanging while many other defendants served prison sentences. The end of
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the IMT led to subsequent trails and proceedings, the longest of which lasted until 1981.6
For much of the world, the memory of Germany’s war crimes was overshadowed by the
Cold War between East and West. In the West, the former Allied nations formed the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be a mutual defensive alliance against the
Soviet Union. The Soviets responded with the Warsaw Pact, a conglomeration of puppet
states and fellow Communist allies to stand against any NATO aggression. The need by
NATO and the Warsaw Pact to quickly rebuild their respective sides of Europe shifted
the focus of the Second World War’s aftermath from punishment to rearmament. Due to
the lack of clarification on the definitions of the crimes committed in the language used
during the Nuremberg Trials, the Wehrmacht was able to escape categorization as a
“criminal organization” unlike the SS (Schutzstaffel), SA (Sturmabteilung), the
Wehrmacht High Command and the Gestapo were.7 By not definitively classifying the
Wehrmacht as a criminal organization, Allied prosecutors set a dangerous precedent.
German soldiers who were tried for war crimes would now not be labelled as criminals
on par with the Nazi administration, allowing a perceived separation to form between the
common Wehrmacht soldier, their SS counterparts, and members of the military high
command. Nonetheless, militarization was stigmatized in postwar West Germany. In
1950, former Wehrmacht generals Adolf Heusinger and Hans Speidel, along with other
former senior officers, gathered in Himmerod Abbey, Germany. Together these former
Wehrmacht officers drew up a forty-page document, known as the Himmerod
Memorandum, calling for the release of German prisoners and for the image of the
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German soldier to be reformed in support of a new German military.8 The Allied Powers,
who were now a part of NATO, agreed to honor the Memorandum in the hopes of
building a German force capable of defending West Germany from possible Soviet
aggression. The circumstances that built the foundation of the so called “Clean
Wehrmacht Myth” were solidified with this agreement.
The current historiography being addressed for this thesis is drawn from a number
of sources ranging from 1955 to the present. This thesis will examine Nuremberg
Military Tribunal testimonies, psychological reports of the Nuremberg defendants and
peer-reviewed historical writings. The early portions of this thesis will focus on the
Nuremberg testimonies and Military Governance documents created by the United States
during the occupation of West Germany. These works will be used to identify the state in
which Germany found itself in at the end of the Second World War. This information is
used to display the conditions in which the “Clean Wehrmacht” Myth was able to form.
The next sections will focus on the formation of the Bundeswehr as West Germany’s new
controversial army. This section showcase the earliest foundations of the “Clean
Wehrmacht” in practice and will later be a central piece in the later discussed
Historikreit, otherwise known as the (“Historians Dispute”) of the 1980s.
The books and collections of US occupational documents that this thesis will be
used alongside foundational secondary sources including Edward Peterson’s The
American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory, Bryce Sait’s The Indoctrination of
the Wehrmacht: Nazi Ideology and the War Crimes of the German Military, and Arieh
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Kochavi’s Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of
Punishment, which offer valuable examination of United States military historical
documents regarding the status of postwar Germany and the eventual collapse of the
American Military Governance (AMG) Denazification Program.9 These books contain
large collections of military documents regarding the occupation until its end in 1955.
Consultation of the memoirs of Erich von Manstein, Albert Kesselring, Wilhelm Keitel
and Albert Speer adds former Nazis’ attempt to rewrite their own history but will not be
used as the main thrust of the argument. Instead this thesis focuses on the rebuilding of
West Germany and its veterans’ associations who directly contributed to forming the
Clean Wehrmacht Myth.10 The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal transcripts will
be used to show the earliest foundations of the myth created by the defendants on trial.
By examining West Germany’s postwar situation and the Nuremberg testimonies, this
thesis evaluates how these works influenced early historical writings of the
Denazification of Germany and the eventual Wehrmacht mythos.
Since the Himmerod Memorandum, perceptions of the German Wehrmacht had
largely been separated from the Nazis. As the German economy and culture flourished
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after the war, films became a strong proponent of the Clean Wehrmacht myth.11 Films
such as Der Arzt von Stalingrad and the 08/15 film trilogy give the impression that
Wehrmacht soldiers were victims of the war.12 As historian Omar Bartov points out in his
2004 essay, “Celluloid Soldiers”, the 1950 German war film culture heavily focused on
portraying an image of innocent Wehrmacht soldiers acting heroically while the
Wehrmacht’s cooperation with the SS and Einsatzgruppen (the death squad section of the
SS) nor their own war crimes were shown.13 Revisionism of the Wehrmacht’s crimes also
came from outside of Germany. French author, Buchenwald survivor, Holocaust denier,
and politician Paul Rassinier wrote several books on the subject of the Holocaust, often
calling into question the accounts of survivors. In his book, The Drama of European
Jews, Rassinier goes as far as claiming that the Nazis never attempted to exterminate
Europeans Jews.14 Rassinier’s works inspired other revisionists both in Europe and the
Americas. Originating in the 1950s this wave of suppressing or more accurately ignoring
the crimes of the Wehrmacht was at the forefront. Neither the German people nor the
NATO nations were particularly concerned with remembering the crimes of the
Wehrmacht and instead focused wholly on the Cold War.15
In the late 1980s a revision of World War II’s history was attempted by European
and American scholars. During this period, an event known as the Historikerstreit, or
“historians’ quarrel” began in 1986. The quarrel was a culmination of previous

Omar Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (Oxford, UK: Oxford
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University Press of Kentucky, 2016) 114-115.
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perspectives on exactly how historians should portray Nazi Germany in history. Before
the Historikerstreit, there was no single prevailing view on how to explain the rise of
Nazi Germany or the German people’s involvement with the Nazi regime. The historian
and German veteran, Fritz Fischer in the mid-1960s supported the concept of a German
“Sonderweg,” or special path, which stated that the Third Reich was a linear culmination
of German history up to that point.16 By the 1970s a school of thought among historians
called the Functionalists stated that German military commanders outside of the German
high command (OKW or OKH) actively assisted in war crimes and the Holocaust, which
at the time ran contrary to the memoirs and histories written by German commanders.
Fischer’s Sonderweg theory fit with the Intentionalism theory which claimed that Hitler
and the Nazi party envisaged the Holocaust during the 1930s and used the antisemitism
of Germany to convince German people to help them. The opposing view of
Functionalism determined that the Holocaust and genocide campaigns slowly evolved as
the Nazis gained power. By 1985, German history was being revisited by a greater
number of authors within German society. One reason why the issue of German history
was revisited was due to President Ronald Reagan’s comments during a ceremony in
Bitburg, Germany. Within the cemetery several Wehrmacht and Waffen SS who had
been buried there after the Second World War. Spurred on by Ronald Reagan’s claim that
those buried in the cemetery were all victims of the Nazi Regime, the Historikerstreit
began in earnest.17
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One of the early works of this period was History in a Land Without History, by
Michael Stürmer, which argued heavily for another look at Germany’s past.18 Much of
the controversy in this period occurred from the more conservative side of the German
historical community, who often bemoaned the defeats or losses suffered by Germany
during the war.19 Historian Ernst Nolte became one of the of primary figureheads of the
conservative view in this controversy when he wrote and published The Past That Will
Not Pass: A Speech That Could Be Written but Not Delivered in a Frankfurt newspaper.20
Nolte’s work in the 1980s was similar to his view of fascism, which he stated in his 1963
work, Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche, in which he claimed that the fascism of the 20th
century arose from the German people’s transition into modernity.21 The opponents of
these views were headed by scholars such as Richard J. Evans, who largely agreed with
aspects of the arguments presented by Fischer and Nolte but, instead argued that National
Socialism took root in the 19th century not just out as a result of modernity, but that the
German middle class had already begun adopting the ideas of the eventual Nazis.22 Evans
came to view German history from the view of the ordinary German, attempting to justify
why the German people could become Nazis to begin with.23
The end of the dispute came in 1989, with Nolte and many of his fellow thinkers
given credit for their research but ultimately, having their ideas of German history were
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excluded from the historical narrative.. Bringing the conversation to a more general
public in 1990s, the Wehrmachtsausstellung, a history exhibit detailing the crimes of the
Wehrmacht’s average soldiers during the Second World War, began its tour around
Germany.24 It ran in its original form from 1991-1995 and later revised for another
exhibition run from 2001-2004. Since then the public perception of the German
Wehrmacht’s history has been a much more mainstay part of public memory. Historians
have been able to write history that tells more about what actually occurred during the
war thanks to the writings made during the Historikerstreit. With widely covered cases
such as Irving v. Penguin Books and Deborah Lipstadt coming to the forefront, the
modern perspective on the activities of the Wehrmacht during the war have largely begun
coinciding with history. The aftereffects of the Himmerod Memorandum and years of
revisionism have faded away to modern times.

Sources & Methodology
Much of the early postwar perspective had a noticeable German bias regarding the
actions of the Wehrmacht. This can be clearly seen from the given testimonies at the
Nuremberg Trails (IMT) and the subsequent trails that lasted until 1981. The published
memoirs and hours of interview and interrogation logs of German commanders
encouraged the international community to see the Wehrmacht as entirely a military arm
that was victimized by the German regime. The United States’ understanding of the war
on the Eastern Front was shaped by the surviving German generals during the 1950s and
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there was an effort by German films, the Himmerod Abbey Memorandum and the NATO
powers to reinvent the German army into something presentable. This ultimately resulted
in the creation of the German Bundeswehr, or Federal Army of Germany, whose early
founders consisted of former Wehrmacht soldiers. With the end of the Allied military
occupation in 1955, West Germany passed a compulsory military conscription law the
very next year to help bolster its forces to defend against possible invasion.25 By the late
1980s, the perception of German crimes had begun to change with special attention being
attributed to the Wehrmacht’s crimes. Historians such as Jünger Förster, Richard J.
Evans, Ian Kershaw and Martin Broszat helped begin a debate within Western Germany
as to how the history of the Wehrmacht and Nazis Germany should be viewed.26
Throughout the 1990s many historians, a notable one being Omer Bartov, continued to
poke holes in the “Good Wehrmacht” myth. In Germany this became evident as well as
museum exhibits began showing depictions of Wehrmacht crimes and retelling the
history behind such actions. This issue also received world-wide attention during the case
of Irving v. Penguin Books and Deborah Lipstadt in the United Kingdom, which ended in
another vindication of the truthfulness to the crimes against humanity that the Nazis and
Wehrmacht partook in.
As detailed in the literature review, this project utilizes the Nuremberg Trial
transcripts and psychology reports of the defendants and prosecutors during the trial’s

Jenny Gesley, “60 Year anniversary of the German Compulsory Military Service Act,” Library of
Congress, July 21, 2016, accessed April 6, 2020, https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2016/07/60-year-anniversary-ofthe-german-compulsory-military-service-act/.
26
It should be noted that Historians of this era had many differing views on the Wehrmacht, Nazis and the
Holocaust. Martin Broszat for example held the Functionalist view of the Holocaust, arguing that it was the
competing views or internal pressure of the Nazis administration that resulted in Holocaust. It should also
be noted that Martin Broszat had been a member of the Nazis Party since 1944.
25

12

proceedings. Examples come from Alfred Jodl, Wilhelm Keitel and Albert Kesselring, all
three of whom were generals in the German Wehrmacht. Russian prosecution will be left
out of this project due to this project’s stated goal of identifying NATO power
perceptions. The organization and documents related to the rebuilding of Germany by the
Western powers will also be examined for the NATO denazification program and its
failings under Lucius Clay and other military governors in Germany. Later analysis will
follow the NATO speeches made in the 1950s on the German Wehrmacht, particularly
from political leaders such as Konrad Adenauer, who spoke on the subject while serving
as chancellor of West Germany. Subsequent works will be drawn primarily from the
1980s and 1990s from historians involved in the Historikerstreit.
This thesis claims that the evolution of the “Clean” Wehrmacht myth is heavily
tied to the testimonies of the Nuremberg Trails, the postwar occupation and histories
written by NATO and the surviving German generals, and the growing fear of
Communism present during the 1950s. This early history formed a strong foundation that
created strong misconceptions that were not fully resolved until the late 1980s. Because
the myth was able to persist for so long, the retelling of the period for historical purposes
is harmed by opponents purporting the myth of the “Clean” Wehrmacht. This thesis
illustrates a clear timeline of events and ideas that can be traced back to a clear and
defined origin. Because the scope of this thesis is limited to the myth and what directly
influenced it, the propensity of information regarding the turmoil of 1960s and 1970s in
Germany will be slim. Information regarding the Cold War will also be present but
limited. The use of German generals’ memoirs is limited with a greater emphasis being
placed upon Nuremberg testimonies and the myth’s part in the early years of West
13

Germany. Through the completion of this project, the myth of a “Clean” Wehrmacht and
its ramifications will be closely documented and explained in detail with regard to how it
affected Germany and the history of the Second World War.
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Chapter I: Nuremberg and the High Command Trials
With the fighting against the Nazi regime nearly over, the Allied powers gathered
together in Potsdam, Germany to discuss how to handle a post Second World War
Europe. The dismantling of the Nazi party and its collaborators became a massive
concern for the victorious powers. The United Nations War Crimes Commission
(UNWCC) formed to organize the upcoming trails and identify individuals to be placed
on trial. The US State Department and the British Foreign Service created the UNWCC
with the intention of investigating and recording war crimes committed by the Axis
powers.27 The men put in charge of the commission, particularly Cecil Hurst and Herbert
Pell, had different visions for the operation of the UNWCC. Cecil Hurst, a British
international lawyer who served on the Court of International Justice, imagined an
organizational body whose purpose is to charge and try war criminals before and
international court of various representative nations. Herbert Pell, a United States
Ambassador and American counterpart to Cecil Hurst, saw the UNWCC as another
method of preventing a third world war by restraining Germany. In Pell’s opinion,
Germany had to be punished so brutally that future Germans would see war as, “[not] a
profitable business.”28 At the time of the commission’s formation in 1943, a precise
definition of war crimes that was accepted by all nations had not been drafted. The lack
of a singular, regulated definition would prove troublesome for the UNWCC’s original
mission. Other councils at the end of past wars had created their own definitions for war

27
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crimes; one such council, held at the end of the First World War, had drawn up a number
of conclusive war crimes. The 1919 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of
the War on the Enforcement of Penalties was used by the UNWCC as a reference point
for identifying the crimes committed in the Second World War. After months of
deliberation on which crimes could be considered war crimes, the UNWCC had decided
that strictly defining war crimes in the context of the Second World War would be too
limiting and would risk excluding other potential crimes yet to be committed.29
As the UNWCC’s deliberation stretched into 1944, the nature of the criminality of
Germany’s war against the Allies was debated. Specifically, it was to be decided if,
“Aggressive war,” prosecutable as an official war crime. The issue of how to define the
war from a legal standpoint was passed on to a legal advisory committee that presented
its interpretation of international law to the UNWCC. Within the legal committee, debate
arose. The majority of the committee argued that under international law, the act of
aggressive war did not represent a crime for which heads of state could be held criminally
responsible before a court. The majority opinion cited the Kellog-Briand Pact which
renounced war as a tool of international diplomacy but did not officially criminalize the
matter.30 The minority view stated that by declaring a war to “enslave foreign nations, to
destroy the civilization of those nations and physically to annihilate…the population on a
racial, political or religious ground,” Germany and its armies had committed innumerable
war crimes against the nations of the world and should be held criminally responsible.31
The so-called, “Aggressive War,” Germany was waging was to be defined as a war crime

29
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itself. Cecil Hurst interjected himself into this argument, presenting a compromise that
Germany’s actions in the Second World War should be made an exception and declared a
war crime. Hurst determined that since the Allies could not come to a singular definition,
the UNWCC should still charge Germany with war crimes to prevent the Allies from
appearing weak in punishing the Nazis. This compromise was agreed to by the UNWCC,
but the British Foreign Service and United States State Department refused to vote in
favor of such a compromise. The debate would not be settled until the London conference
in 1945 after the war had officially ended. In the charter for the International Military
Tribunal (IMT), aggressive war was to be considered a criminal offense in which an
individual or organization may be charged in part or in whole.32
The second largest role taken on by the UNWCC was the identification and
charging of war criminals throughout the German military and administration. Early on in
1943, the known names and responsibilities of German officials was dubious at best. The
German High Command was largely known, but information regarding those who carried
out orders and to what extent was limited. The Allies had a serious lack of presence in
mainland Europe and the shortage of POWs and liberated populations meant the
knowledge of perpetrators among individual military units was sparse. The extermination
of witnesses and the destruction of evidence by the SS, Gestapo and Wehrmacht in their
operations made evidence collection for the UNWCC incredibly difficult. To address this
problem, the UNWCC decided to arrest any member or former member of the SS or
Gestapo that they could get their hands on. This decision was also extended to
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, “Trials of War Criminals
Before the Nurenberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10: Volume 3,” Nuremberg:
United States Government Printing Office Washington, 1951 XIII-XIV, accessed March 21, 2020,
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-III.pdf.
32
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Wehrmacht generals and important members of the civil administration. The UNWCC
hoped that these individuals could be detained long enough for evidence to be collected
and to prevent any criminals from escaping. The UNWCC had determined that no
immunity should be given to any member of the Nazi government; all would be
investigated and if need be, brought to trial. In their first compiled lists of war criminals
the UNWCC presented 712 names of Germans and Italians who had committed
international crimes. Among those names were diplomats, regional administrators,
political personalities and 17 Wehrmacht generals.33
In February of 1938, Adolf Hitler had abolished Germany’s War Department and
took command of the Wehrmacht as the Minister of War. After this, Hitler created the
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), which advised Hitler on directing the armed
forces.34 The German High Command offered direct support to Hitler and ran the war
effort as it broke international treaties in pursuing an aggressive war. It was imperative
that Hitler and the Nazis gained the support of the military general staff because their war
experience of invaluable for the wars Hitler intended to wage. The generals allied
themselves with the Nazism’s goals by seeking to expand German territory and undo the
punishments made by the Versailles Treaty. Fearing that the Nazis would build their own
army, the generals of the old Reichswehr willing cooperated with the Nazi party and
agreed to aid them in their ambitions. The willingness of the German generals to involve
themselves in the aims of the Nazis put them firmly in the same lot as the Nazis by the
wars end. The OKW was directly response for the carrying out of the Nazi agenda on the
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warfront, conquering new territory illegally from the other nations of Europe and killing
its people.35
The German OKW’s highest members were charged by the UNWCC for war
crimes. The UNWCC’s High Command trial had chosen to charge only, “The
group…[of] first, German officers who held the top positions in the four supreme
commands…and second, the officers who held the top field commands.”36 The
indictments laid against these members were, “Crimes against Peace, War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity, and Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those Crimes,” as
defined by the tribunal’s own charter for the trial.37 A large part of the reasoning for the
charges levelled against the German military command was the justification that,
“Aggressive war cannot be prepared and waged without intense activity on the part of all
branches of the Armed Forces…”38 The German High Command wholly committed
themselves to the act of aggressive war and could be proven by the actions laid out before
the beginning of the war. The UNWCC listed the evidence of the secret rearmament
made after the First World War, the creation of a formal military air force, the
conscription law made in 1935 and the reoccupation of the Rhineland. The UNWCC
prosecutors argued that the preparation for rebuilding the German military was intended
to be used in wars against Germany’s European neighbors. General Alfred Jodl, a

Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, “Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression: Volume 2 Chapter XV Part 7,” United Nations War Crimes Commission, 1945-1946, accessed
March 18, 2020, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/chap_09.asp.
36
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, “Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression,” accessed March 18, 2020, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/chap_09.asp.
37
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, “Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression,” accessed March 18, 2020, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/chap_09.asp.
38
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, “Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression,” accessed March 18, 2020, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/chap_09.asp.
35

19

member of the accused had been quoted in a 1943 speech stating, “…the part…played by
the National Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight in nurturing fighting
strength and in rearming the German people…has so happily been successful.”39 The
German generals were being given another chance after the punishing Versailles Treaty
to fight again. German aggression is evidenced further by the acquisition of Austria, the
invasion of Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Poland, Belgium, Netherlands and France
and the invasion of the Soviet Union. The defense council for the High Command
attempted to counter the charges presented by the Tribunal’s indictment by stating that
the charges had not been preestablished international law prior to the war. The banning of
aggressive war had not been agreed upon after the First World War nor had the legal
international definition of War Crimes been internationally accepted by the nations of the
world, including Germany. The UNWCC had already grappled with such qualms in 1943
when the planning of the Tribunal began. In a simple move, the Tribunal stated that such
an objection was impossible thanks to Article 3 of the Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal’s (IMT) charter which indicated that, “Neither the Tribunal, its members nor
their alternates can be challenged by the prosecution, or by the Defendants or their
Counsel.”40 The trial of the German High Command would continue unimpeded.
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The Defense Argument at Nuremberg
In their defense against the charges, German commanders denied their guilt by
laying the blame squarely on Hitler and the SS. Herman Goering, commander in chief of
the Luftwaffe (German Airforce) and Hitler’s chosen successor, stated during his trials at
Nuremberg “Why isn’t Hitler here to answer for these things?”41 Wilhelm Keitel, chief of
Wehrmacht High Command (OKW), shared a similar sentiment towards Hitler’s suicide
in his own memoir, stating “Hitler himself chose death rather than accept responsibility
for the actions of the OKW, of Colonel-General Jodl and myself.”42 The Wehrmacht
officers and Nazi party officials on trial saw fit to shift the Second World War’s blame
almost entirely onto Adolf Hitler in an attempt to clear themselves of wrong-doing.43
Some even chose to place a large portion of blame onto the SS. Describing the SS as a
“…state within a state,” the commanders attributed the SS’s power in support of Hitler
and Himmler as being at odds with the General Staff.44 Keitel and his fellow Nazi Hans
Frank, the Governor-General of Poland and legal advisor to Hitler and the Nazis during
the 1930s, made even bolder claims as the trials wore on. While at Nuremberg they
asserted in an interview with their court psychiatrist that “…we really didn’t believe
Hitler meant war.” When questioned a few days later on why he did not understand the
invasion of Poland in 1939, would lead to a war with France and Britain, Keitel
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responded that Hitler had never told them of the Allied protection of Poland and was
surprised they chose to go to war. When Joachim von Ribbentrop, foreign minister for the
Third Reich, overheard this, he is reported to have responded “Well it was announced on
September 1st. Maybe you didn’t see it.”45
The claims made by the German High Command were false. The OKW and
important members of the Nazi government had been aware of Hitler’s intention to start a
war since the repeal of the Reich’s Defense Law in May of 1935. Again in 1937, a
meeting occurred between Hitler, Admiral Erich Raeder, Constantin von Neurath and
Herman Goering regarding plans to invade and occupy Austria and Czechoslovakia,
which might likely lead to war with Great Britain and France. The plan stated, “German
politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, England and France to whom a strong
German colossus in the center of Europe would be intolerable.”46 The Nazi High
Command understood even in 1937, that Germany’s territorial expansions would bring
France and England into conflict with the Third Reich. After the success in
Czechoslovakia a plan known as Case Green was drawn up by Hitler, Goering, Raeder,
Keitel and Colonel-General Walther von Brauchitsch, among several other officers in
OKW. Created in April of 1938, Case Green had several portions dedicated to France and
England entering a potential war against Germany. One passage dealing specifically with
the English threat read “England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony
which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with
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England will be a life-and-death struggle.”47 It was inevitable in the German military
mindset that war with England would occur so long as Germany continued to make
territorial gains.
To dismiss the prospect of war with the powers of Europe as entirely Hitler’s idea
is simply false. Undeniably the defendants at Nuremberg chose to deliberately obscure
the truth about their actions during the war and blame Hitler and other prominent Nazis.
Jodl himself commented on the testimonies of the Wehrmacht generals stating “…those
generals are just talking now to preserve their own existence.”48 The OKW repeatedly
placed the blame on other figures and organizations just as the rest of the general staff
did. Admiral Doenitz argued in a personal statement with his court psychiatrist that
defected soldiers and commanders were “…preaching out-and-out treason,” while in
Soviet hands. Doenitz argued that this propaganda had resulted in, “…the [loss of] lives
of thousands of German women and children by causing defection in the ranks.”49 The
Germans placed on trial would do anything to shift the blame of the war, those who lost
their lives and the destruction of Germany and Europe onto anyone else they could.
When Field Marshal Friedrich von Paulus was brought to testify regarding the invasion
of Russia he told the court that the German OKW had been beginning to prepare for an
illegal war with the Soviet Union as early as September 1940. Paulus specifically
indicated that Keitel, Jodl and Goering all had substantial parts in planning this such a
war. The testimony resulted in uproar from the OKW’s defendants. They angerly
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dismissed Paulus’s claims, simply calling him a dirty pig and a traitor. Goering himself
even stating to his attorney that “We’ve got to disgrace that traitor!”50 The high
command’s refusal to take any sort of responsibility for the Second World War and their
insistence on blaming Hitler everything created a strong foundation for the Clean
Wehrmacht Myth. OKW’s attempt to dodge all blame for the war painted the picture that
the Wehrmacht were not responsible for Germany’s crimes but were victims as well.
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Chapter II: The Clean Wehrmacht Myth’s Origins in the Second
World War and State of Post-War Germany
To understand the formation of the “Clean” Wehrmacht myth, it is prudent to go
back to the Second World War and clearly identify that the Wehrmacht indeed had an
active part in war crime activities beyond engaging in an illegal war. Nominally, the need
to clearly identify that the Wehrmacht indeed had an active part in war crime activities
beyond engaging in an illegal war. The German military before the Second World War
had already been trained as a political military force for decades. The German officer
schools of the past acted much like a university as well as a military training institution to
ensure its officer corps fell in line politically with current administrations.51 German
officers up to and during the Second World War were expected to be politically well
versed. When the Nazi party came into power in 1933, the training and teachings given to
the army’s officer corps also shifted to match the ideals of the Nazi party. Particularly
during the administration of General Werner von Blomberg, the Nazification of the
Wehrmacht was expected. Under Blomberg’s supervision, officers were educated on
“political questions,” along with guidelines regarding the Nazi ideology.52 The
indoctrination of Wehrmacht officers contributed to their willingness to carry out
questionable orders. The most prominent example of the criminal orders issued is the
Wehrmacht Kommissarbefehl, or Commissar Order, which was given sixteen days prior
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to Operation Barbarossa, the June 22 invasion of the Soviet Union.53 This order directed
that soldiers were to eliminate political commissars, prisoners of war and supposed
partisans who might offer resistance to the Wehrmacht. The order also covered were
individuals in the front and rear areas who were, “…suspected of resistance, sabotage or
instigation thereto.”54 In regards to Commissars captured behind the frontlines the order
mandated that these individuals be handed over specifically to the Einsatzgruppen
(mobile killing units) and SS. Officers in the Wehrmacht followed these orders
impeccably, at times even going further than necessary because of the ideological
training they received while in officer school. German soldiers involved in Operation
Barbarossa were willing participants in a clear war of extermination against Bolshevism
and the Slavic peoples. Crimes against Soviet troops, supposed Partisans and civilians
was rampant throughout the campaigns in Soviet territory with no signs of abating.55
Soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht were not only indoctrinated into the Nazi’s
ideology, they willingly embraced such ideals and methods as evidenced by soldiers on
mass carrying out such orders since the 1941 invasion until the end of the war.
In the postwar reconstruction of Germany, the Allied Powers divided up Germany
into four zones of control. Each zone’s occupiers agreed to carry out a policy of
rebuilding and Denazification in order to quickly reform Germany and destroy Nazism at
the same time. The Western Powers goal for Denazification was to remove any individual
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with party membership in the NSDAP from political or bureaucratic positions. Initially,
the military governance attempted to identify and remove Nazis party members through
questioning and surveys.56 As this program continued a unique paradox presented itself to
the occupation forces. Much like the military, the Nazi Government had organized their
political system in such a way that in order to gain certain positions, one would have to
become a party member. This policy resulted in numerous citizens becoming Nazis
without believing in the Nazi cause or ideology. Thus, government officials,
schoolteachers, secretaries, bureaucrats, etc. competent or otherwise were all cardcarrying Nazis. Yet, interviewers and surveyors of German society even as early as 1944
quickly identified that much of the German population was anti-Nazi. The youth of
Germany did not support Nazism either. This was especially true among Catholic
families due to Nazism’s disgust with religions being reciprocated by Catholics. Among
the working class and skilled workers, the number of categorical “true Nazis,” was
incredibly small, often in the single digits percentage wise. Among managers and
executives, the percentage was estimated at 14%, leaving the vast majority non-Nazi.57
Among the non-military population, Nazism was far less popular by the end of the war,
resulting in the people either abandoning Nazi ideals or cementing anti-Nazi sentiment.
However, the Nazi administration’s liberal issuing of party membership resulted in a
complication for the Occupation Powers.
The Occupation governments now had to identify who joined the party and then
whether or not they believed in the Nazi ideology. To combat this, the Occupational
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Powers compiled an arrest category list. Individuals who fell under certain categories
were arrested and placed into temporary internment camps until their innocence could be
verified. Classified as Law No. 8 by the US occupation the law stated that, “It shall be
unlawful for any business enterprise to employ any member of the Nazi Party or its
affiliate organizations in positions other than ordinary labor.” Implemented in September
1945, Law No. 8 proved too difficult to manage due to number of individuals that
qualified for arrest. By the end of 1945, 30,00 more Germans had been arrested and
placed into internment camps.58 This, coupled with the already arrested 70,000 since the
War’s end resulted in an incredible backlog of appeals for detainees. As time went on
individuals processed and tried under this law were given less and less punishing because
of the burden of so many detainees. In an effort to placate growing complaints from local
Germans, the US military governance chose to have German manned court take over
some of the more important cases. Of the 575 court cases for categorized “major
offenders,” given to the German courts, they listed 355 as followers of the Nazi regime
rather than high ranking perpetrators. They further exonerated 49 additional major
offenders.59 When this was noticed, it was perceived by the US military governance that
the German courts were sabotaging the process of denazification. The German people
were growing tired of the large numbers being tried in all occupational zones. Tens of
thousands of citizens, Nazi or otherwise were being pulled from the workforce needed to
rebuild Germany and instead shifted to internment camps to await trail. Amongst the
populace Germans in the new government insisted that enforcing Law No. 8 was political
suicide while officials of the US military governance found the policy too logistically
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demanding, an, “administrative impossibility.”60 The process of denazification was
difficult in concept and a near impossibility in practice. Identifying true Nazis amongst
the populace was proving to be difficult to accomplish for the US Occupation. The new
government of West Germany had to keep up with Nazi party members and then had to
rebuild the government with said party members because those were the only Germans
competent for the job at the time. Germans of any merit or in government positions
running the nation were required to be party members during the Nazi regime. Because of
the difficulty in identifying every “true Nazi,” in power, many with Nazi sympathizers
slipped through the cracks and gained positions of power.
In some cases, self-proclaimed Nazis were hired on by the United States for
service in various industries or scientific fields. Operation Paperclip was a US program to
acquire high-value Nazis to be used within the US.61In order to gain an edge during the
Cold War, the US acquired as many Nazi scientists as they could, regardless of their
association with Hitler or the Nazi party. Along with this the CIA implemented Operation
Gladio, a covert “stay-behind,” paramilitary movement organized in the nations of
Western Europe. The goal of this program was for paramilitary resistance groups to
perform sabotage operations behind enemy lines in the event of a Soviet invasion of
Europe. These groups were to mimic the successes of the French and Polish resistances
that had risen against the Nazis.62 Among these groups was the Schnez-Truppe, the
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German branch of Gladio’s paramilitaries. This organization formed in 1949, by Albert
Schnez and other former Wehrmacht and Waffen SS veterans from the war. Basing
themselves in the US Occupation zone, this group would combat Soviet forces until
NATO could intervene. Germany, after the war, had no formal military until the
formation of the Bundeswehr in the 1950s so the Schnez-Truppe would be the next line
of defense after NATO forces withdrew. At the end of the 1940s the German government
was reorganized but still influenced by former Nazis or Nazi sympathizers in power due
to the difficulty in identifying and removing them all. The US recruited Nazi scientists
for Operation Paperclip and tens of thousands of potential laborers were placed into
internment camps. If the United States believed using German scientists, many of whom
were former Nazis, as a viable option for gaining an advantage in the Cold War, it should
come as no surprise that former Nazis were also deemed as acceptable components of a
force designed to repel an invasion of West German territory. The nation’s only capable
fighting force outside of NATO was comprised of former SS and Wehrmacht forces.
Removing Nazis from Germany proved too complex for the reconstruction
government to fully accomplish. The left-over Nazis which were missed by Allied
occupation programs or hired by the Allies themselves remained in Germany long after
the war had ended. The formation of the formal German army in 1955, known as the
Bundeswehr, would be formed from the Schnez-Truppe and a provisional border force
comprised of former SS and Wehrmacht troops. The commanders of this new army were
generals from the former Nazi Reich. Men like general Hans Speidel, Erwin Rommel’s
former military aid during the Second World War, and lieutenant general Adolf
Heusinger. Both had served the Nazi regime in the Wehrmacht’s general staff. Heusinger
30

would go on to become the Chairman of the NATO military Committee from 19611964.63 The exoneration and employment of these generals perpetuated the Clean
Wehrmacht Myth. The Allied powers encouraged the reformation of the German armed
forces and made no protest when it was staffed by former Wehrmacht and SS soldiers.
These former Nazis would continue to shape the new Germany whose image and purpose
was remade to stand against Communism and the Soviet menace.64
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Chapter III: After Nuremberg: Postwar Concessions
After the Nuremberg Trials, the Nazi high command was fully dissolved. Most of
the administration and military staff that made up the party’s core elite were condemned
to various prison sentences or execution. Among the Nazi officials prosecuted in later
trails, those in association with the SS or with the Holocaust received life imprisonment
or the death penalty. Those involved with places like Auschwitz, Dachau and other
concentration camps received the most death sentences. Nearly every defendant standing
trail for involvement with the camps were executed for their involvement.65 The same
occurred in International Military Tribunal for the Far East, were 7 of 28 defendants got
the death penalty and 16 received life imprisonments. This represents 82% of the charged
military officials for the Far East trials.66 In stark contrast most generals of Wehrmacht
operations typically received only prison sentences and not death penalties. Of the 14
charged generals in the High Command Trial, started in late 1947, only two received life
imprisonments, the rest received sentences of no less than 5 years, excluding those
acquitted.67 The Wehrmacht high command officers were charged with nearly equivalent
crimes as were their Japanese counterparts, yet the Wehrmacht officers comparatively
received much lighter sentences. Those charged in the High Command Trial were
members of the German Wehrmacht Oberkommando (OKB), the operational
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headquarters who had direct contact with Hitler during the war. The commanders below
these individuals were not placed on trial by the Nuremberg courts on the same scale as
OKB, leaving them free to return home. Though a vast number of war crimes were
committed by the Wehrmacht during the war, the majority of the trials focused on
prosecuting the Nazi Party administration. Close to two hundred SS and Concentration
Camp members had been charged for their actions in the field or in participation to the
Holocaust, most being sentenced to life imprisonment or to death. In comparison, the
Wehrmacht high command were given prison sentences, the least of which being 5
years.68 An attempt at organizing additional trials for some of the other commanders
would occur in 1948 and 1949 involving Gerd von Rundstedt, Erich von Manstein,
Walther von Brauchitsch and Rudolf Strauss. These trials were planned to be run by the
British courts and hoped to prosecute these four generals, however before the trials could
commence, Brauchitsch dies of heart failure and Rundstedt and Strauss are deemed too
unhealthy to stand trial. As a result, only Manstein was brought to trial and given a
seventeen-year sentence which was later reduced to twelve years in 1950 due to outside
pressures from the British and German public. Three years later von Manstein was
released from prison for eye problems after only serving four years of his original
seventeen-year sentence.
Being pardoned or freed from their sentences the German military commanders
found themselves in a completely new Germany. The reconstruction of West Germany
was geared towards stabilizing and rebuilding the country it to stand against possible
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intrusion from the Soviet Bloc. In this new Germany the status and societal privilege of
being a German officer had been lost. Further insult towards veterans of the Wehrmacht
occurred when the repeated petitions for military pensions to be paid was rejected by the
occupied government.69 Former officers fell upon hard times in the new, weak civilian
markets. Wehrmacht officers exited service with little transferable skills with older
officers having it far worse. The lack of skills and inability to acquire civilian
employment resulted in many of these formerly important officers becoming
unemployed. Many Wehrmacht officers filed complaints with the Allied administration,
citing the horrible conditions they now endured, and bemoaned the lack of pensions.
Among the most famous complaints came from General Wilhelm von Leeb, who wrote
his own letter to the occupation government, arguing that by denying pensions to
servicemen the Allies were “legally as well as morally and humanly,” unjust.70 The
injustice of being reduced to a mere civilian and being shamed for the Second World War
had angered the surviving officer corps.
Rebuilding the West German bureaucracy to resemble that of the Weimar
Republic’s, the new Federal Republic began its bureaucratic reforms in the fall of 1949.71
With the new bureaucracy being shaped and the West German government taking over
much of the operation of the nation, German veterans made another plea to the Federal
Republic’s finance ministers for the restoration of pensions. Arguments between former
Wehrmacht and the new government would last for months as both sides attempted to
arrive at a favorable agreement. In the fall of 1950, Konrad Adenauer, first Chancellor of
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West Germany, addressed the issue along with the planned rearmament of West
Germany. In his speech, Adenauer agreed with Wehrmacht veterans stating that their
treatment after the war was “completely unjust…” and that these men had been made
“collectively responsible for the lost war…” He argued that “The time of collective guilt
of the militarists…must be ended once and for all.”72 Adenauer’s 1950 speech furthered
the image of a Wehrmacht who was victimized by the Nazi government. In subsequent
laws and policies considered by the West German government, the veterans of the
Wehrmacht began receiving pensions for their service in the Second World War and from
the Interwar years, further legitimizing the perception of the Clean Wehrmacht.
The success of the Wehrmacht veterans in acquiring their pensions emboldened
them and fostered a wave of veteran legislation.73 Large numbers of veteran advocacy
groups began to spring up in the new Republic all falling under the branch of “citizens’
associations,” under official documentation. These organizations attempted to represent
veterans similarly to organizations made before the Second World War. With the
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and China’s later intervention that same year,
Adenauer and these new veterans’ associations used the war in Asia as a way of
readdressing West German rearmament. The veterans’ associations made an appeal to
Chancellor Adenauer agreeing to aid with rearmament in exchange for a redressing of the
Wehrmacht’s image. In a letter to Adenauer the veterans’ groups argued that the
formation of a new army rested on “the ending of the German soldier’s defamation
[which] is the prerequisite for the revival of a solid army...”74 The final request made by
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the veterans’ associations was that soldiers imprisoned for war crimes to be released. The
government agreed to the terms, forming a singular veterans organization for the country
known as the Verband Deutscher Soldaten, “Association of German Soldiers.” The other
demands made by the veterans would be honored after the writing of the Himmerod
Memorandum. West Germany formed their own official army in 1955. Known as the
Bundeswehr and made up of many former Wehrmacht and Waffen SS freed from prisons
across Europe. The veterans of the Second World War would continue to serve as a
defensive force against potential Soviet invasion. Officers for the Bundeswehr were
drawn from the former general staff and many had their sentences lightened or forgiven.
In 1955, West Germany was admitted to NATO and its forces were rearmed for the
defense of Western Europe.75
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Chapter IV: Conclusion
The Wehrmacht officers who fought in the Second World War had sought to
exonerate themselves from the reputation of the Nazi Regime after the war. The general
corps of the Wehrmacht especially sought to free themselves of the Reich’s reputation.
The officers had viewed much of the war to be Hitler’s fault and were furious that their
legacies were dragged down with his. During the Nuremberg trials, prominent officers
were quoted blaming Hitler. Many other Nazi elites in their later memoirs and post war
writings also shifted the blame onto Hitler or those who were executed following postwar
war crimes trails. The Allied powers took this opportunity to acquired statements from
the former commanders of the Wehrmacht regarding the conflict on the Eastern front
from their perspective. The amount of information the Allies gleamed from the Soviet
perspective was slim and the Allied command sought to obtain a clearer picture of the
war in the East. Beyond this many German commanders felt their own need to create
their accounts of the war. General Erich von Manstein, being among the most famous
examples, wrote scathing assessments on Hitler’s leadership. Von Manstein blamed
Hitler’s belief of the “power of will,” which von Manstein attributed to much of how
Hitler operated Germany strategically or otherwise.76 At Nuremberg, the officers on trial
and those called as witnesses placed blame onto Hitler, Himmler and the Nazi party.
Attempting to ignore or lie about the plans for aggressive war and the war crimes
committed during the war, the German officers refused to accept responsibility for the
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role they played in the war. The postwar occupation and reconstruction of Germany by
the Allied powers saw a period of demilitarization and denazification that ultimately
failed by the conclusion of the occupation. The task of denazifying Germany proved to be
too much effort for the resource scare occupational governments leaving the job half
finished. West Germany’s new government in 1949, ignored external Allied pleas for
continuation of their occupational programs and pressed on with rebuilding their nation
as quickly as possible. In this period the veterans and officers of the Wehrmacht made
their return and tried to reestablish themselves within the postwar government. Realizing
that the advantages of having the Wehrmacht veterans on his side, Konrad Adenauer
agreed to allow Wehrmacht veterans to reform their history in an effort to secure a new
German military sanctioned by the Allies. The veterans of the war petitioned the NATO
powers, who were reeling from the Korean War, to reform West Germany’s fighting
force as a safeguard for Europe. NATO agreed and imprisoned veterans were released.
Now free and welcomed into a rearming society, these veterans would see to it that their
legacy be secured from defamation with the writing of memoirs and accounts further
placing the blame onto the Nazis and those who died at Nuremberg.
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